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CONTRACTING UNDER AMENDED 2-207
JAMES J. WHITE*

INTRODUCTION

Amended Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code! (the
Code) states new contract rules. I call these "contract rules" to avoid
the labels of contract formation and contract interpretation. These new
rules cure many of the problems presented by current Section 2-2072 and
remind courts that the purpose of Section 2-207 is to interpret a contract
that has been made, not to see if a contract exists.
One is tempted to label current Section 2-207 as a contract
formation provision-and to some extent that would be right-but most
of this Section's work has been in contract interpretation, not in contract
formation. Put differently, the Section does not affirm the existence of a
contract; rather it works where the parties' behavior already shows a
contract. Like a diligent German Shepherd, this Section searches among
the verbal rubble for the terms of the contract.
I.

TROUBLES WITH CURRENT SECTION

2-207

As Professor Gilmore made plain in his delightful letter to Bob
Summers, the old Section has many deficiencies. Following is the
correspondence of this letter, dated September 10, 1980:
Dear Professor Summers:

I have most recently been reading over your admirable
discussion of § 2-207. Let me say at the outset that I
thoroughly approve of your decision to let the disagreement
between you and White on the proper construction of that
abominable section hang out instead of papering it over.
I do think that insufficient attention has been paid to the
tangled drafting history of § 2-207. (I am not about to reveal
Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
*
B.A., Amherst, 1956; J.D., University of Michigan, 1962. I thank Jon-Michael Wheat,
J.D. 2004 University of Michigan, a scholar and a judge of fine whiskey, for his
exceptional research assistance.
1.
2.

U.C.C. § 2-207 (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
Id. § 2-207 (2003).
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any "secret history"; I had nothing to do with the drafting of
§ 2-207 at any stage and I cannot remember having ever
discussed it with Karl Llewellyn.) The point is that as late as
the 1952 draft of the Code, § 2-207 consisted only of what are
now subsections (1) and (2). Subsection (3) was added in
response to criticisms of the New York Law Revision
Commission (which were probably based on suggestions by
John Honnold, who acted as a consultant on Article 2 for the
Commission). The 1952 version of § 2-207 was bad enough
(particularly in the (2)(b) reference to "material alteration")
but the addition of subsection (3), without the slightest
explanation of how it was supposed to mesh with (1)and (2),
turned the section into a complete disaster. To make matters
worse, the 1952 Conunent (which had presumably been
drafted at a much earlier point by Llewellyn) was never
adequately revised to take the new subsection (3) into account.
(Beginning in 1949 or 1950, Llewellyn refused to have
anything to do with the Article 2 Comments, which were
thereafter periodically updated by an anonymous hack in the
Philadelphia office of the American Law Institute. It might be
interesting to check back through earlier drafts of the Code to
see how the text and Comment of § 2-207 evolved through
1952.) The later (1966) revisions of the Comment, which you
attributed to Braucher, were band-aid jobs.
My principal quarrel with your discussion of § 2-207and all the other discussions I have read-is that you treat the
section much too respectfully-as if it had had sprung, all of a
piece, like Minerva from the brow of Jove. The truth is that it
was a miserable, bungled, patched-up job-both text and
comment-to which various hands-Llewellyn, Honnold,
Braucher and my anonymous hack-contributed at various
points, each acting independently of the others (like the blind
men and the elephant). It strikes me as ludicrous to pretend
that the section can, or should, be construed as an integrated
whole in light of what "the draftsman" "intended." (I might
note that, when subsection (3) was added, Llewellyn had
ceased to have anything to do with the Code project.) One of
the chores which we hire courts (and commentators) to
perform is to clean up the messes which statutory draftsmen
leave behind them. The proper approach to § 2-207, which is
arguably the greatest statutory mess of all time, is to take it
light-heartedly (or, as Professor Corbin used to say,
cheerfully).
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Which
case ....

brings

me

to

the

"infamous"

Rotolith

On the facts of the case with respect to the October

shipment as Judge Aldrich stated them, I think it would have
been outrageous to have saddled the seller with warranties,
which (as the buyer knew) he had expressly (and quite
reasonably) disclaimed.
I grant you the opinion does
considerable violence to the statutory language, even in the
1952 version .... Even so, I find it hard to conceive of a
situation in which the commission of statutory mayhem was
more justifiable or more necessary.
Surely, when the
legislature goes mad, the courts can (and should) restore us to
sanity.
In the 1950's I used to go around the country peddling the
Code. On one occasion I had to explain Article 2 to a group
of "corporate counsel" in California-they represented
airplane manufacturers and similar great enterprises. When I
finished with § 2-207, they were, so far as I could tell,
appalled. They were not so much concerned with the obvious
drafting ambiguities as they were with the (equally obvious)
intent to bind contracts at the earliest possible point. They
evidently preferred not to be bound (whether their clients were
selling or buying) until all the formalities had been
accomplished, the last i dotted, the last t crossed. Perhaps, as
[Stewart] Macaulay has suggested, businessmen don't really
want binding contracts. Perhaps there was something to be
said for the common law rules of offer and acceptance. At all
events: Down with § 2-207.
Yours,
Grant Gilmore3
Current Section 2-207 suffers from six major ailments. First, the
section was originally designed to deal with cases like Poel v.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. of New York.4 In Poel, one party sent
his writing to the other party, and the other party responded by
submitting his version of the writing.5 Despite the forms' agreement on
the basic terms of the contract, the offeror and offeree both escaped

3.
Letter from Grant Gilmore, Professor, Vermont Law School, to Robert S.
Summers, Professor, Cornell University Law School (Sept. 10, 1980) (on file with
author).
4.
110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915)
5.
Id. at 621-22.
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because the acceptance was not the mirror image of the offer.6 The last
sentence in Section 2-207 solves that problem, though awkwardly. 7
Under Section 2-207, if the forms conform to one another at least on the
basics, then each party is bound even though the forms are not word-forword.
Subsection 1 of 2-207 was troublesome only because cases like Poel
rarely come before the courts. For the parties to a contract to present a
true contract formation case, at least one party has to reconsider before
performance and deny the existence of a contract. In modem American
commercial contracting, this scenario seldom happens, or when it does,
it seldom results in a lawsuit.
Where the deal aborts before
performance, the parties apparently look elsewhere; they rarely find it
sensible to sue on a fully executory contract for the sale of goods.
Therefore, Section 2-207 has seldom been called into service in aid of
any party to a fully executory contract.
A second problem with Section 2-207 is that the Section and its
comments give uncertain direction regarding the question of whether
"additional or different" terms in the offer were in the contract.8 Some
scholars-Summers is one-argue that subsections 1 and 2 merely
restate and slightly modify the standard common law rule that would
apply when an offeree accepted an offer but made additional suggestions
for the contract.
Consider Ardente v. Horan,9 a case that inhabits many contracts
casebooks. In that case, Ardente apparently accepted the Horans' offer
to sell their house. In Ardente's acceptance letter, he stated that he was
"concerned" about whether a dining room tapestry, the fireplace fixtures
and certain other items would pass to him as the buyer of the Horans'
fancy house in Newport, Rhode Island.'" To Ardente's disappointment,
the court found that his response was not an acceptance with suggestions
for additional terms, but that it constituted no acceptance at all."
Subsection 1 urges courts to regard responses like Ardente's in
commercial settings as acceptances with proposals for other terms, not
as counteroffers. 2
Subsection 2 gives rules to decide whether the proposed additional
terms contained in the acceptance are in the contract. Nothing,
however, clarifies whether the terms in the offer that are not repeated in
6.
See id. at 623.
7.
See U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
8.
Id. § 2-207(1) & cmts. 2-3.
9.
366 A.2d 162 (R.I. 1976).
10.
Id. at 163 (internal quotations omitted).
11.
Id. at 165-66. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island determined that
Ardente's letter was "not consistent with an absolute acceptance accompanied by a
request for a gratuitous benefit." Id. at 166.
12.
See U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
HeinOnline -- 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 726 2004
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the acceptance or those that are contradicted by terms in the acceptance
are in the contract. Following common law, Summers would say, by
hypothesis, that every acceptance takes every term in the offer. Thus,
Summers would say that all of the offeror's terms are in the contract and
the only issue left deals with the fireplace fixtures and other items.
These are the offeree's proposals for addition, and they are to be treated
under Section 2-207(2). If one looks at Section 2-207 through the
glasses of a common law scholar who is primarily interested in holding
a welsher in, then that outcome makes sense. This view grants more
power to the offeror than to the offeree, and it facilitates contract
formation by throwing some of the offeree's terms overboard.
But if one is less respectful of the common law-where acceptances
dutifully march behind offers-and more sympathetic to modem
commercial practice (where phone calls and e-mails go back and forth
and documents are labeled as purchase orders or confirmations, not as
offers and acceptances), then it makes less sense to give the upper hand
to the person whose document happened to be sent first. So the
barbarians-myself and some others-read Section 2-207 to allow the
acceptance or confirmation not only to make a contract but also to knock
terms out of the offer when the acceptance contains contradictory terms
even though the parties perform. Being either more ignorant or less
respectful of the common law than Summers, most courts have adopted
the latter interpretation of Section 2-207 that is now known as the
"knockout rule." 13
A third difficulty is that Section 2-207(1) refers to "additional or
different" terms, 4 but 2-207(2) refers only to "additional" terms.' 5 One
might have read that distinction to affirm Summers's common-law
approach described above, namely to allow certain terms that appeared
only in the acceptance or confirmation to get into the contract but never
to allow one to knockout a "different" term, a term that by hypothesis
was found in the offer. But what terms are "different"? If the buyer's
offer carried an implied term, such as the implied warranty of
merchantability, but had no express warranty, then was a disclaimer in
the acceptance "different" because it negated an implied term or merely
"additional" since there was no express warranty in the offer? 6
13.
See, e.g., Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184, 189 (1st
Cir. 1997); Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994)
(predicting that Illinois courts would adopt the knockout rule); Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt

Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984); Reilly Foam Corp. v. Rubbermaid Corp.,
206 F. Supp. 2d 643, 653-54 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (collecting cases); Superior Boiler
Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628, 635 (R.I. 1998).
14.
U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
15.
Id. § 2-207(2).

16.
See Northrop, 29 F.3d at 1175 (internal quotations omitted) (commenting
that the most sensible approach in these cases may equate "different" and "additional"
HeinOnline -- 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 727 2004
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A fourth difficulty with Section 2-207 was that subsection 3
explained what was in the contract and what was not, but only where the
"writings of the parties [did] not otherwise establish a contract."

7

On

its terms, subsection 3 would not allow one to supplement the express
terms of the contract by implied terms, such as the warranty of
merchantability, where a contract had been formed by the writings and
not merely recognized by the parties' behavior. Courts have had little
difficulty with this barrier.' 8
Fifth, Section 2-207 gives courts too little maneuvering room for
examination of the parties' conduct to find the terms on which they have
agreed. Put differently, the contracts that come to the courts for
interpretation are more varied and far more eccentric than one could
ever imagine. For example, what if the parties exchange conflicting
forms and then each later agrees to the conflicting term on the other's
form?
What about where one party had repeatedly included an
arbitration clause in his form, but the other had performed in silence?
Surely the second party knew that the first party wanted arbitration, yet
the first party had never stopped performance to insist on the agreement
to arbitrate. Does the first party's dogged insistence overcome the
second party's persistent silence? And what about the many cases where
one party, either orally or by nonverbal behavior, seems to acquiesce to
a term of the other party?' 9 This Section needs room for the courts to
accommodate all of this behavior.
The final difficulty arises from the first, as Section 2-207 is partly a
contract formation provision (for example, does this behavior make a
contract?), and partly a contract interpretation provision (for example,
what are the terms of this contract that the parties' verbal and nonverbal
behavior recognizes?). Subsection 1 deals with contract formation, but
the other two subsections deal with interpretation.' 0 Would it be clearer
if those separate functions were separated?

terms despite the express language of Section 2-207). Note also that the Massachusetts
statute inserts "or different" following "additional" in subsection 2. MASS. GEN. LAws
ch. 106, § 2-207(2) (2004).
17.
U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
See, e.g., Bosway Tube & Steel Corp. v. McKay Mach. Co., 237 N.W.2d
18.
488, 489-90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (applying Section 2-207(3) to include implied
warranty despite the presence of a contract on the forms).
19.
See, e.g., Constr. Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505,
509-10 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that buyer accepted the terms of seller's counteroffer
where buyer sought a change only in the payment terms of the counter offer and raised
no objection to seller's other modifications of the original offer).
20.
See U.C.C. § 2-207(1)-(3).
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II.

AMENDED SECTION

2-207

The proposed amendments to Section 2-207 reads in full as follows:
Subject to Section 2-202, if (i) conduct by both parties
recognizes the existence of a contract although their records do
not otherwise establish a contract, (ii) a contract is formed by
an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract formed in any
manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms additional
to or different from those in the contract being confirmed, the
terms of the contract, are:
(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties;
(b) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both
parties agree; and
(c) terms supplied or incorporated under any
provision of this Act.2
It is easy to see the footprints of the Section's former troubles in
amended Section 2-207. First, contract formation is banished, to the
extent possible, to Section 2-20622 and elsewhere. Second, there is no
virtue in coming forward first and no necessary precedence in having
one's document labeled the offer, because the second record has the
same power as the first. Third, amended Section 2-207 does not impose
any condition like the condition in current Section 2-207(3) that requires
that the contract not be formed by the writings.23 Fourth, the amended
Section is free of much of the complexity that is found in the old Section
and that carried over into the early drafts of revised Article 2.24
21.
Id. § 2-207 (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
Amended Section 2-206(3) reads: "A definite and seasonable expression of
22.
acceptance in a record operates as an acceptance even if it contains terms additional to or
different from the offer." Id. § 2-206(3).
23.
Compare id. § 2-207, with id. § 2-207(3) (2003).
24.
Id. For example, the February 1999 proposed revision of Section 2-207
reads:
(a) This section is subject to Section[s] 2-105 and 2-206.
(b) If a contract is formed by offer and acceptance and the acceptance
is by a record containing terms additional to or different from the offer or by
conduct of the parties that recognizes the existence of a contract but the
records of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract for sale, the terms
of the contract include:
(1) terms in the records of the parties to the extent that the
records agree;
(2) terms, whether or not in a record, to which the parties
have otherwise agreed;
(3) terms in a record supplied by a party to which the other
party has expressly agreed; and

HeinOnline -- 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 729 2004
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Finally, subsection b of Section 2-207 explicitly invites courts to
regard terms to which the parties have otherwise "agreed" as part of the
contract. 5 This subsection gives courts latitude to find agreement in the
verbal and nonverbal behavior of the parties, even when the term to
which they have agreed is not included in the records that either party
has sent, and even when the agreed-to term is contradicted by the
other's form. I predict that this judicial interpretation of parties'
conduct will be the battlefield under amended Section 2-207. If my
(4) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of
[the Uniform Commercial Code].
(c) If a party confirms a contract by a record received by the other
party that contains terms that vary [add to or differ from] the previous
agreement, the terms of the contract include:
(1) terms in the confirmations of the parties, to the extent
that they agree;
(2) terms in a confirming record that vary [add to or differ
from] the previous agreement to which the other party has
expressly agreed; and
(3) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of
this article.
(d) If a contract for sale is formed in any manner and thereafter the
seller in a record proposes terms to the buyer that vary [add to or differ
from] terms previously agreed, the following rules apply:
(1) If the seller could have disclosed the varying terms to
the buyer in a commercially reasonable manner at the time of
contract formation and failed to do so, the terms do not become
part of the contract unless expressly agreed to by the buyer;
(2) If the seller could not have disclosed the varying terms
to the buyer in a commercially reasonable manner, the seller
shall by conspicuous language in a record notify the buyer at the
time of contract formation that additional or different terms will
be proposed.
(A) If the seller gives conspicuous notice, the
buyer may either accept the proposed terms by any
method reasonable under the circumstances or reject
the proposed terms and return the goods.
(B) If the seller fails to give conspicuous
notice, the proposed terms do not become part of the
contract unless expressly agreed to by the buyer.
(3) Upon returning goods to the seller, the buyer has a
right to:
(A) a refund; and
(B) reimbursement of any reasonable expenses
incurred related to the return and in compliance with
any instructions of the seller for return or, in the
absence of instructions, return postage or similar
reasonable expenses in returning the goods.
(f) In this section, an express agreement to terms cannot be based upon
there [sic] mere retention or use of goods.
Id. § 2-207 (Proposed Revision of U.C.C. Art. 2-Sales 1999).
Id. § 2-207(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
25.
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guess is right, then it is not quite fair to say that amended Section 2-207
is only about interpretation and not about the contract formation,
because courts will also be answering formation questions when they
decide whether the parties have agreed to a term.
Even though amended Section 2-207 simplifies the law and even if
it cures some of the problems of current Section 2-207, we should not
be too quick to applaud. The amended Section has not been enacted in
any state. It is still to be tested against the iron rule of statutory
drafting: tomorrow's hard questions are never the same as yesterday's.
But why not speculate on some of the questions that might come before
the amended Section and on its response to those questions.
A.

Mine and Mine Only

Many purchase order and confirmation forms now in use have
variations on mine and mine-only terms.26 These terms state that a
person can form a contract with the master of the form only if the
person agrees to all of the terms on the proffered form and proposes
neither additional terms nor any that contradict the terms in the form. In
current Section 2-207 the mine-only term mostly has the effect of
forestalling a contract on the forms and of throwing the parties into
subsection 3.27 Therefore, usually the contract is composed of the terms
that are the same on both forms and of terms implied by law.2
Amended Section 2-207 is the same in that mine-only terms will be
quite beside the point except in unusual cases.29 In the usual casewhere the parties perform even though they have exchanged documents
that contain conflicting and additional terms-their behavior will make
the contract under Section 2-206.3o Under amended Section 2-207, the
For example, in Boise Cascade Corp. v. Etsco, Ltd., the seller's offer
26.
contained the following language: "ACCEPTANCE: Seller's acceptance is expressly
made conditional on Buyer's assent to Seller's terms and conditions as set forth herein";
and the buyer's acceptance read:
ACCEPTANCE: Acceptance of this Purchase Order, whether by written
acknowledgment or by performance by Seller, shall be upon the terms and
conditions hereof; no other terms or conditions shall be binding on Buyer
unless written approval thereof specifically referring to such other terms and
conditions shall have been given to Seller.
39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 410, 412, No. 83-1052 FR, 1984 WL 178957 (D.
Or. 1984).
See U.C.C. § 2-207.
27.

See Boise, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 414, 1984 WL 178957 ("The effect of
28.
the fact that both offer and acceptance expressly state that any contract formed must
contain their terms and no others is that no contract was formed by the writings of the
parties. ...Thus [Section 2-207(3)] is effective and controls the present case."
(citations omitted)).
29.
See U.C.C. § 2-207.
30.
See id. § 2-206.
HeinOnline -- 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 731 2004
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contract is composed of the terms that appear on both records together
with terms implied under Article 2."'
A mine-only term is likely to affect the parties' rights only when
one party aborts the contracting process before his behavior amounts to
the nonverbal recognition of a contract. In that case, under either
amended Section 2-206 or under the same language in current Section 2207, the mine-only term will cause the form that bears the term to be a
counteroffer, not an acceptance.32 If that is so, then no contract will
have been formed and the master of that document will not have been
bound. So, amended Section 2-207 and the transfer of part of current
Section 2-207 to amended Section 2-206 are unlikely to change the law.
B.

Form Hierarchy

To say that all forms are equal-no matter what they say and no
matter what they are-overstates the case. Consider a negotiation that is
started by a buyer's request for quotation ("RFQ") to several potential
Assume that the RFQ states elaborate specifications,
suppliers.
precisely recites the times for performance, and contemplates responses
from multiple sellers. Even where the contract is concluded by the
winning supplier sending its form, the parties probably accord a higher
status to the terms in the RFQ than to those in any form that either party
might exchange thereafter.33 If the terms in the RFQ have not been
explicitly negotiated away, then I suspect that the parties would regard
those as binding on both parties because the RFQ is a noble among the
commoners, purchase orders and acknowledgments. If I am right, then
it might be appropriate under subsection b of Section 2-207 for a court
to conclude that the RFQ's terms prevail even in the face of
contradictory terms in the other forms.
C. Oral Intervention
Sometimes the initial oral exchange is not the last. In some cases,
one party will make an oral objection to a term on the other's form.' If
the other agrees to the first party's oral request, then there is an
agreement sufficient for subsection b3 but subject to the parol evidence

31.
32.
33.

See id. § 2-207.
Compare id. § 2-206, with id. § 2-207 (2003).
But see, e.g., William M. Hendrickson, Inc. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 47 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1284, 1296-97, No. 00-CV-3711, 2002 WL
398641, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (giving no greater weight to terms in the RFQ).

34.
See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nielsons, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 896,
898-99 (D. Colo. 1986) (sustaining oral objection to seller's limitation of liability term).
35.

See U.C.C. § 2-207(b) (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
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rule. 36 That rule would bar this new oral agreement only if the
exchange that preceded the oral request had resulted in a contract (one
of the few places where one must note the moment of contracting under
the amended Section), and if the "confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree" or the terms are "otherwise set forth in a writing intended
by the parties as a final expression of their agreement." 37 Typically, the
confirmatory memoranda will not agree; one is seeking oral agreement
from the other precisely because the forms do not agree. 3"
Of course, if one party objects to the other's oral proposal, then
there is no agreement at that moment. Under this situation, courts will
be faced with the newly complicated task of interpreting the parties'
performance in light of this intermediate and often indeterminate oral
exchange. Where the oral exchange results in agreement without any
writing, that agreement should be part of the deal. The parol evidence
rule will seldom bar enforcement, nor should Section 2-209 on
modification do so." Often the oral intervention will occur before a
contract has been made-even if the parties are on a trajectory to make a
contract through a combination of oral agreements, exchange of forms,
and performance. In that case, the oral exchange is merely further
negotiation and not the modification of an existing contract.
But even if one concludes that the parties' earlier behavior had
made a binding contract, can subsection b be read to recognize this new
oral agreement as part of that contract embryo without regard to Section
2-209? Section 2-207 is built on the hypothesis that it is seldom
congruent with commercial expectations in the form contract setting to
ask when the contract was made. Even if the parties make an oral
contract at day one, terms on which their forms agree that might have
been exchanged on days twenty and forty are a part of the contract
Id. § 2-202.
36.
Id. Section 2-202 reads in full:
37.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as

a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or
supplemented
(a) by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade (Section 1-303); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.

Id.
See Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Sargent & Greenleaf, Inc., 802
38.
F. Supp. 680, 689 (D.R.I. 1992) (noting that parties' forms are seldom intended to be
fully integrated agreements).
39.

See U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2-209 (2003).
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under amended Section 2-207(a)." Should we apply similar reasoning
under subsection b to the oral agreements that follow agreements made
by exchange of forms or by earlier oral exchanges? 4
D. OralAgreement Followed By One or More Forms
Invariably commercial contracting parties communicate with one
another face-to-face, by telephone, or by e-mail before they conclude a
contract. Sometimes there will be no contract until the exchange of
forms, sometimes there will be no contract until later than that. In some
cases, however, a contract will be reached orally before any forms are
exchanged or orally in the middle of the exchange of forms.
Assume an oral agreement 2 that is followed by a mutual exchange
of forms and performance. The contract includes the terms agreed upon
orally together with any terms that appear in both forms and any terms
supplied by Article 2.
What if a term in one of the forms contradicts a term in the oral
agreement? Tough. By hypothesis the parties have an oral agreement to
a particular term. A later contradiction of that term by one party would
not in itself be an "agreement" under Section 2-207(b) and so would not
remove the term that both had agreed upon orally. 3 By hypothesis, this
term is in only one form. This term does not enter through subsection a
and it cannot be a gap filler that finds hope in subsection c because a
contrary term has already been agreed upon.'
And what if the term in the oral agreement is a gap filler such as
the implied warranty of merchantability? Assume that the buyer's
confirmation has no specific express warranty language (except to the
extent that the agreed product description would be a warranty) and that
the seller's form has a disclaimer of warranty. Without more, the
disclaimer is not in the contract because it is neither agreed upon under
subsection b nor in both records for subsection a."

40.
Id. § 2-207(a) (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
41.
See id. § 2-207(b). Even ifone concluded that any oral agreement would
have to pass through Section 2-209, the oral agreement's only stumbling block would be
the statute of frauds, and that might be satisfied by subsequent performance.
42.
Assume also that later forms or performance will satisfy the statue of
frauds.
43.
See id.
44.
See id. § 2-207(a), (c).
45.
See id. § 2-207(a)-(b).
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Oral Discussion Without Agreement Followed by One or More
Forms

The preceding case is different where the parties do not reach
agreement in their oral interchange. In that case, documents from the
from
parties need only be compared and the contract contain the terms
c. 46
both forms-under subsection a and gap fillers from subsection
Where both parties are to send forms, we should be slow to find
agreement to another's form by performance. A priori, I would not
expect my counterpart's initial performance to be an agreement to my
terms when I know that he will be sending his own form, and the same
for him. One of the plausible purposes of sending a form is to forestall
any inference of agreement to the other's boilerplate; I may not get my
terms by sending my form, but at least I cleanse my performance of the
inference that I have accepted his terms by beginning to work.
Where only one party follows up an oral agreement, I think the
outcome is the same. However, the passive party's inaction opens his
performance to an enlarged risk. A court might construe his behavior to
be an agreement to the other party's form.47
F. PerformanceAfter the Exchange of One or More Forms
Performance after an incomplete or fragmentary exchange seldom
has a clear, objective meaning about agreement to another's terms.
Sometimes performance shows agreement to another's terms, but more
often it only means that the negotiated terms are satisfactory, not that the
party intends to accept all of your lawyer's boilerplate. In an era of
just-in-time schedules, low inventories, and emphasis on lean and quick
operating, it is bad policy to punish a quick and early performer by
requiring that he adhere to his counterpart's terms simply because he
was more diligent than another party might have been.
One can think of cases where the seller's making and sending goods
to the buyer should be construed to be acceptance of all of the terms on
the buyer's purchase order. Surely that type of performance signals the
seller's agreement to the negotiated terms, such as price, quantity,
specifications, and delivery and payment terms. It would often be fair
to construe this type of performance as an agreement to other boilerplate

See id. § 2-207(a), (c).
46.
See, e.g., Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 35 A.2d 194, 19647.
97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (holding that terms on a form become part of the oral
contract if no objection is made). But see Lemmer v. IDS Prop., Inc., 304 N.W.2d
864, 871 (Minn. 1980) (holding that terms on a form modifying the oral agreement did
not become part of the contract).
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terms such as those on risk of loss, warranty, and responsibility for
damages or cure.
Here the courts will earn their keep. Section 2-207 invites courts to
interpret the parties' behavior in light of the expectations, needs, and
practices in the games that they play. The inferences to be drawn from
a seller's hedging on a contract for the sale of $100 million of electricity
may be different from those inferences to be drawn from a buyer
procuring a loan to buy $10 million of fertilizer. Both of those instances
give rise to different inferences than from a tier-one automobile
supplier's shipment of coil springs to General Motors.
III. IF YOU TIE YOUR SHOELACES
One of the ways that clever lawyers have tried to escape the reach
of Section 2-207 is to assert that the other party's behavior is an
acceptance of all of the terms on the first party's form. For example, a
form might say that any action-even in preparation for performancewill be an acceptance of the offeror's terms.4" In an act of splendid
chutzpah (or unforgivable ignorance), the drafters of the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) ruled that one has
"manifest[ed] assent" (agreed to something) if he "intentionally engages
in conduct.., with reason to know that the other party.. . may infer
from the conduct that the person assents to the ... term. "9 Suppose
that your form asserts that my intentional tying my shoelaces tomorrow
morning will constitute assenting to all of your terms. Since I cannot tie
my shoelaces unintentionally and -since I have no valet, I'm stuck. Not
so?
In the infamous ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg decision, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested the same when it
48.
For cases that deem commencement of performance to be an acceptance of
terms, see CECG, Inc. v. Magic Software Enterprises, Inc., No. 02-1036, 2002 WL
31248483, at *4 (3d Cir. 2002); Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Gradall Co., 702 F. Supp.
726, 733-34 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Corn-Corp Industries,Inc. v. H&H Machine Tool Co. of
Iowa, No. 69318, 1996 WL 631100, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); and Hendrickson, 47
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1296-97, 2002 WL 398641, at *9.
49.
U.C.I.T.A. § 112(a)(2) (2002). Section 112(a) of UCITA reads:
(a) [How person manifests assent.] A person manifests assent to a
record or term if the person, acting with knowledge of, or after having an
opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it:
(1) authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt or
accept it; or
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements
with reason to know that the other party or its electronic agent
may infer from the conduct or statement that the person assents
to the record or term.
Id. § 112 (a).
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stated that Zeidenberg was stuck with the terms on the box because the
offeror was "the master of his offer."5" The statement is correct, but the
application is wrong. To say that the offeror is the "master of his offer"
means only that he may rule out certain things as acceptance. That is,
he can limit the universe of things that will be regarded as acceptances,
not that he can expand acceptance beyond the universe that a reasonable
person in the offeree's shoes would believe to be acceptance.
ProCD is not far-fetched, Two years ago one of my students
brought me a clear plastic sleeve in which she had received the power
cord to her computer. On its face was the message: "By opening this
plastic sleeve, you agree to all of the terms of the seller's contract and
license."
Such terms should not transform behavior that would not normally
be an acceptance into an acceptance, and, in general, they have not.5' If
one limits UCITA Section 112(a) to the conventional case where a buyer
clicks "I Agree," the rule is a tautology. In that case, the click would
be regarded by all reasonable people as an agreement just as the oral
expression of the same words would mean agreement. So, in my
opinion, one can safely tie his shoelaces without fear of making an
unfavorable contract. Conceivably there are cases near the border
where such a term might push an act over the line and make something
an acceptance that would otherwise fail, but I cannot identify any such
cases. If Section 112 of the UCITA reaches to your shoelaces, then the
law is an ass.
A.

Terms in an Invoice With the Goods

Does the seller save himself by including some terms on an invoice
that is delivered with the goods long after both believed the contract had
been concluded? I am not sure. This situation is a commercial variation
of the issue that I discuss in the next Section.5 2 As I point out below,
the courts and drafters have long wrestled with the legal standing of
terms delivered with the product, and no one has yet won two out of
three falls. It might make a difference if the parties had dealt with one
50.
86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A vendor, as master of the offer,
may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct
that constitutes acceptance.").
51.
See, e.g., Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 392 (Civ. Ct.
2001) ("[I]f the defendant, as a term and condition of filing a claim, required the
consumer to sing '0 Sole Mio' in Yiddish while standing on his or her head in Macy's
window, only Mandy Patinkin would qualify to object to the receipt of defective
equipment. This cannot be so.").
52.
Compare Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan.
2000) (holding that terms in the box are not part of contract), with Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing the terms inside the box).
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another before and if the buyer knew that the seller's terms would come
with the products. There is nothing in amended Section 2-103(1)(m),
which defines "record,"" or in amended Section 2-207(a) that keeps an
invoice from being a record that could satisfy subsection a.' But there
is some drafting history and there is Section 2-207, comment five.5"
The comment and the history show that the drafters were uneasy about
terms delivered with the goods and that they were uncertain about the
right outcome. 6
Can we distinguish the invoice with the goods from language on or
inside the box such as cases involving Gateway and ProCD? It is hard
to distinguish but perhaps possible. If, as I suggest above, terms on a
record that come after the parties have reached an oral agreement
become part of the contract under Section 2-207(a) without regard to
Section 2-209-that is, if the same terms are on the other's form-then
the invoice terms should become part of the contract too.57 If the buyer
has proposed the same terms, then he can hardly complain. On the
other hand, because there was only one form in the Gateway cases and
ProCD, the sellers in those cases must claim an agreement under
Section 2-207(b), not just that there are matching forms under Section 2207(a).
B.

Terms On or In the Box

Section 2-207 has done most of its work in industrial contracting.
Most of Section 2-207 cases are between industrial manufacturers and
industrial buyers; the latter intend to resell or to use the products in their
own manufacturing process. A separate contracting practice between
consumer and nonconsumer end users and manufacturers has persisted
even longer than the industrial contracting process. Even though the
consumer and industrial practices present similar contract issues, the two
practices have marched in parallel with little reference to each other on
similar issues. ProCD, the case that put Madison, Wisconsin on the
contract map, has changed that. The courts, drafters of amended Article
2, and particularly the commentators have now awakened to the
common issues in the parallel tracks and to the need to reconcile the
cases in the industrial forum with those in the consumer forum.

53.
U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(m) ("Record means information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form." (internal quotations omitted)).
54.
Id. § 2-207(a).
55.
Id. § 2-207 cmt. 5.

56.

Id.

57.

See id. §§ 2-207(a), 2-209.
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Manufacturers of retail goods have long attached contract
statements to or included contract documents with new goods. Early
examples were warnings, disclaimers, or limitation of remedies on sacks
of seed or containers of fertilizer. 58 As this Article is written, nearly all
boxed appliances and other boxed electronic hardware sold new at retail
include contract documents. Some terms in the box favor the buyer: the
limited express warranty, promises to repair or replace, and the promise
of a help-line for computer hardware. Some terms favor the seller:
limitations of remedy, restrictions on forum, arbitration clauses, and
reductions in the limitations period. 9
Licensors and sellers of software try to protect their intellectual
property interests by terms inside or on the box or on the software itself.
They hope to make the transaction a license and not a sale to avoid the
first sale doctrine. Where the market is segmented-some parties will
pay more and others will pay less for the same product-sellers badly
want to keep the buyers in the less expensive market from committing
arbitrage (that is sellers hope to prevent purchasers in cheap markets
from reselling into the dear market).
The first, and still the most prominent case is ProCD. At issue in
Plaintiff ProCD
ProCD was Zeidenberg's attempt at arbitrage.
compiled more than 3000 telephone directories into a computer
See, e.g., Mullis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc., 505 S.E.2d 818, 821-22
58.
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to enforce a disclaimer and limitation of warranty on
seed). In Mullis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc., the disclaimer read:
NOTICE TO PURCHASER: [Seller] warrants that, at the time of delivery,
the seeds in this container conform to the label description as required under
state and federal laws. [Seller] makes no other warranties whether written,
oral, statutory, express or implied, including but not limited to warranty of
merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or otherwise, that would
extend beyond such descriptions contained herein. In any event, [seller's]
liability for breach of any warranty with respect to such seeds shall be
limited to the purchase price. Purchaser assumes the risk for results
obtained from use of such seeds, including but not limited to the condition
under which the seeds are planted, germinated, or grown.
Id. at 819. In Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., the disclaimer on the bag
read:
Subject to the limitation of liability herein set forth, we warrant that seeds or
bulbs sold are as described on the container, within recognized tolerances.
Our liability on this warranty is limited in amount to the purchase price of
the seeds or bulbs. In no way shall we be liable for the crop.
454 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Ark. 1970) (refusing to enforce limitation of remedies located on
a tomato seed bag).
Manufacturers of retail goods sold to consumers rarely disclaim the implied
59.
warranty of merchantability. In almost all cases, manufacturers furnish to consumers
some form of express warranty of the goods. Thus, any attempt to disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantability would violate the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act. See Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. I, §§ 101-112, 88 Stat.
2183-92 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000)).
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database, at a cost of more than $10 million, and sold it as
"SelectPhone" on CD-ROM.'
The database contained a wealth of
information including nine-digit zip codes and census industrial codes,
and permitted users, often businesses, to search the database according
to preferred criteria. 6' ProCD engaged in price discrimination, selling
its database to the general public for personal use at a low price
(approximately $150 for the set of five discs) while selling information
to the trade for a higher price. 62 ProCD attempted to control arbitrage
by notifying consumers on the box that they were bound by the terms of
the enclosed license. 63 This license was encoded on the CD-ROM disks,
printed in the manual, and appeared on a user's screen every time the
software was used. 64 The license purported to limit consumer use of the
application program and listings to noncommercial purposes.
Zeidenberg decided to ignore the license after he bought three
consumer packages of SelectPhone in 1994 from a retail outlet in
Madison, Wisconsin.65 He formed Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc.,
to resell the information in the SelectPhone database. 66 ProCD filed suit
seeking an injunction against further dissemination that exceeds the
rights specified in the license-identical in each of the three packages
that Zeidenberg had purchased. 67 The district court held the licenses
ineffectual because the licensing terms did not appear on the outside of
the packages. 6 The court added that the second and third licenses stand
no different from the first, even though they are identical, because they
might have been different, and a purchaser does not agree to-and
cannot be bound by-terms that were secret at the time of purchase.69
The district court held that Zeidenberg was not bound by the terms in
the box because he had not seen them before the contract had been
made.70
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Zeidenberg was bound
by the license terms and applied Article 2"' (but not Section 2-207
specifically). The court of appeals drew an analogy to cases such as

60.
61.

86 F.3d at 1449.
Id.

62.

Id.

63.
Id. at 1450.
64.
Id. As noted at the conference, the relevant language was buried deep
within the manual in small font.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. While the Seventh Circuit stated otherwise, Zeidenberg denies that he
charged for use of the data once he had posted it on his site.
67.
Id.
68.
id.
69.
Id.; 908 F.Supp. 640, 654-55 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
70.
86 F.3d at 1451-53.
71.
Id.
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Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute2 where the U.S. Supreme Court
found that the buyer of a cruise ticket was bound by a choice of law
clause even though she had not seen the clause until long after the
contract had been made.73
Whatever the merit of the outcome in ProCD-Zeidenberg was
surely a naughty fellow who should have his hands slapped-Judge
Frank Easterbrook's consideration of the Article 2 issues was sloppy.
First, Easterbrook applied Article 2 without considering whether the
contract for the use of a database was a "transaction in goods" and so
within the scope of Article 2.74 Second, he dismissed Section 2-207 in
one sentence: "[olur case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is
irrelevant."7" Easterbrook's statement is wrong; nothing in Section 2207, its comments, or case law limits this Section to cases with more
than one form. 76 Indeed, the second sentence in comment one states a
hypothetical case with only one form.77
A series of cases involving Gateway's arbitration clause-which is
contained in the computer box-have agreed with ProCD,78 but one
case, Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., goes the other way. In Klocek, Judge
Vratil applied the Kansas equivalent of Section 2-207 and found that the
buyer's "act of keeping the computer past five days was not sufficient to
demonstrate that plaintiff expressly agreed to the Standard Terms." 79
Before we turn to amended Section 2-207's treatment of terms in
the box, we should give the Seventh Circuit its due. Easterbrook's
discussion of the economics of retail contracting and of the virtue of
72.
499 U.S. 585 (1991).
73.
See generally id.
74. One can argue that the contract in ProCD is not for goods and that it is
governed by the common law rather than by Article 2. See U.C.C. § 2-102. In Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Easterbrook is saved from repeating this error, for that case dealt with a
contract for
75.
76.
77.

the sale of goods, namely a computer. 105 F.3d at 1148.
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2003).
Comment 1 to Section 2-207 states:

This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is the
written confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or
by informal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or
both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as
agreed upon and adding terms not discussed.
Id. § 2-207 cmt. 1.

78. See, e.g., Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL
307369, at *1 (Del. Ch. 2000) (involving an arbitration provision shipped with the
computer); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (App. Div. 1998)

(involving a warranty disclaimer included inside the computer packaging); Levy v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1060, 1062, 1997 WL 823611

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (involving a warranty disclaimer included the inside computer
packaging).
79.
104 F. Supp. at 1341.
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giving sellers easy ways to discriminate in price among sets of potential
buyers deserves more respect than does his careless dismissal of Section
2-207.80 When Easterbrook argues that society is well served by law
that makes contracting inexpensive and easy, 8' he is right. For a nickel
or a dime, almost all of us would give up our right to resell software and
would agree to arbitrate. If that is so, then it hardly makes sense to
charge our seller a dollar in contracting costs to make that deal with us.
Still, the contract law and our conventional understanding deserve some
respect; there must be reasons why we persist in looking for agreement
and why courts routinely reject some behavior as inadequate to show
agreement.
But these issues are not new. Consider how the drafters of Article
2, now and earlier, have dealt with them. Fifty years ago, Llewellyn
recognized the challenge to standard contract rules that were presented
by terms that are attached to or delivered with the goods. He made only
a half-hearted stab at the problem in comment seven to Section 2-313:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation are
made or samples are shown is not material. The sole question
is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be
regarded as part of the contract. If language is used after the
closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery
asks and receives an additional assurance), the warranty
becomes a modification, and need not be supported by
consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order.n
In urging that the "sole question is whether the language ... [is]

fairly to be regarded as part of the contract," Llewellyn sounds like
amended Section 2-207.83 Of course, Llewellyn was addressing the
limited issue of express warranties under Section 2-313 where the
problem is complicated by the requirement that an express warranty be
"part of the basis of the bargain." 84
In the Article 2 amendment process, the drafting committee dealt
with these issues twice. First, the committee adopted Section 2-313A.'
Second, the committee considered and abandoned a subsection in
Section 2-207 that specifically addressed to terms inside or on the box.
The poverty of our imagination is shown by the fact that no one on the
drafting committee appears ever to have noticed that the proposed
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-52.
See id. at 1451.
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7.
Compare id., with id. § 2-207 (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
Id.§ 2-313(1)(a) (2003).
Id. § 2-313A (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
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subsection to Section 2-207 and Section 2-313A addressed the same
question.
Section 2-313A is a comprehensive codification of only a piece of
the law on express warranties in the box. Section 2-313A reads as
follows:
Obligation To Remote Purchaser Created By Record
Packaged With Or Accompanying Goods.
(1) In this section:
(a) "Immediate buyer" means a buyer that
enters into a contract with the seller.
(b) "Remote purchaser" means a person that
buys or leases goods from an immediate buyer or
other person in the normal chain of distribution.
(2) This section applies only to new goods and goods sold
or leased as new goods in a transaction of purchase in the
normal chain of distribution.
(3) If in a record packaged with or accompanying the
goods the seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise that
relates to the goods, provides a description that relates to the
goods, or makes a remedial promise, and the seller reasonably
expects the record to be, and the record is, furnished to the
remote purchaser, the seller has an obligation to the remote
purchaser that:
(a) the goods will conform to the affirmation of
fact, promise or description unless a reasonable
person in the position of the remote purchaser would
not believe that the affirmation of fact, promise or
description created an obligation; and
(b) the seller will perform the remedial promise.
(5) The following rules apply to the remedies for breach
of an obligation created under this section:
(a) The seller may modify or limit the remedies
available to the remote purchaser if the modification
or limitation is furnished to the remote purchaser no
later than the time of purchase or if the modification
or limitation is contained in the record that contains
the affirmation of fact, promise or description.
(b) Subject to a modification or limitation of
remedy, a seller in breach is liable for incidental or
consequential damages under Section 2-715, but not
for lost profits.
(c) The remote purchaser may recover as
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damages for breach of a seller's obligation arising
under subsection (2) the loss resulting in the ordinary
course of events as determined in any reasonable
manner.
(6) An obligation that is not a remedial promise is
breached if the goods did not conform to the affirmation of
fact, promise or description creating the obligation when the
goods left the seller's control.86
If Gateway sells through Circuit City to a consumer, then
Gateway's warranty inside the box to the consumer (remote purchaser)
is binding and Gateway's arbitration clause and other limitation of
remedies are binding on the consumer under Section 2-313A(5)(a). 7 So
far so good.
What becomes of the same consumer's rights as a third-party
beneficiary of Gateway's warranty to Circuit City? Neither those
warranties nor any limitation on damages for breach of them is
addressed in Section 2-313A.8 8 Nothing in Section 2-313A affects the
consumer's rights under the applicable alternative of Section 2-318's
privity rules. 89 Any right to sue as a third-party beneficiary and any bar

to such suit for lack of privity remains unchanged.
If Gateway sells directly to the consumer, then no part of Section 2313A applies and the parties are back under Section 2-313 and cases
interpreting Section 2-313.90 Ironically, a consumer who buys directly
from Gateway may not be bound by Gateway's arbitration term under
Klocek, yet if the same person buys from a retailer, then he will be
bound by the arbitration clause because of Section 2-313A. So our
attempt to codify even this small part of law on terms in the box has not
distinguished us.
In 2000, long after Section 2-313A had been installed and agreed
upon, the drafting committee considered a subsection in Section 2-207
that would have dealt with all terms in the box.9" The subsection reads
as follows:

86.

Id.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. § 2-313A(5)(a).
See id. § 2-313A.
See Id. § 2-318 (2003).
Compare id. § 2-313A (Proposed Final Draft 2003), with id. § 2-313

(2003).
91.
I confess that it never occurred to me when we were considering the
subsection to Section 2-207 that we should look back at Section 2-313A. We treated
Section 2-313A as put to bed-after a big fight with sellers and advertisers several years

before-and, to my recollection, no one suggested that the two sections might be
stepping on one another's toes.
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(b) Terms to which the buyer has not otherwise agreed
that are delivered to the buyer with the goods become part of
the contract, subject to 2-202, only if:
(1) the buyer does not within [twenty] [thirty]
days of their receipt object to the terms and offer to
return the goods at the seller's expense,
(2) the terms do not contradict the terms of the
parties' agreement, and
(3) taken as a whole, the terms do not materially
92
alter the contract to the detriment of the buyer.
The subsection was accompanied by a preliminary comment that
stated that the usual terms in the box-even if they limited the buyer's
remedies-would not materially alter the contract to the detriment of the
buyer if they contained an express warranty and a promise of consumer
help." Note that the word "agreement" defined in Section 1-201(3) 9
and included in amended Section 2-207(b)(2) of the proposed subsection
does not include gap fillers provided by Article 2; so a limitation of
remedies would not contradict an agreement that, by law, included the
remedies provided by part 7 of Article 2. Such implied terms would be
a part of the contract but not part of the agreement.
I thought the proposal gave the sellers what they needed without
opening the buyers to onerous terms. For example, an arbitration clause
with a $4000 filing fee would materially alter the terms to the buyer's
detriment, but arbitration without such a fee would not. Eccentric,
finicky buyers could have protected themselves by returning the product.
Because eccentrics are scarce, the cost to Gateway of a duty to accept
returns would have been inconsequential.
I was wrong. The buyers-represented by Gail Hillebrand from
Consumers Union-were tempted but feared that the commercial sellers
would agree to include the subsection in the drafts approved by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, and then take subsection 2 away in the
legislatures."
The sellers-represented by Bob Rader, counsel for
Gateway-also opposed. So the committee rejected the subsection four
to three. Of course, we will never know the true position of the buyers
or sellers or of their agents because their positions are revealed, if ever,
92.

id. § 2-207(b) (Proposed Revision of U.C.C. Art. 2-Sales 1999).

93.

See id. § 2-207 cmt. 3.

94.

See id. § 2-102(3) (2003).

95.
In a couple of states, such as North Dakota, secured creditors did not
conform to the expectations of consumer debtors when Article 9 was being considered.
Local bankers' organizations apparently did not regard themselves bound by deals that
had been struck during the negotiation of the uniform version of revised Article 9.
Hilebrand was apparently spooked by that experience.

HeinOnline -- 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 745 2004

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
only after a provision has been adopted. Each side might have believed
that it would prevail in court. If that was their belief, then one side is
wrong.
The subsection was replaced by comment 5 that reads:
The section omits any specific treatment of terms on or in the
container in which the goods are delivered. This Article takes
no position on whether a court should follow the reasoning in
Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (Section
2-207 does not apply to these cases; the "rolling contract" is
not made until acceptance of the seller's terms after the goods
and terms are delivered) or the contrary reasoning in StepSaver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91
(3d Cir. 1991) [and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d
1332 (D. Kan. 2000)] (contract is made at time of oral or other
bargain and "shrink wrap" terms or those in the container
become part of the contract only if they comply with
provisions such as are contained in Section 2-207).96
This comment leaves courts free to apply Section 2-207 or to decline to
do so. It frees buyers to argue that their cases are within Section 2-207
and sellers to argue that the same cases are outside of Section 2-207.
Does amended Section 2-207 apply to cases like those involving
Gateway? I think this Section does apply. Easterbrook was never right
about cases with only one form, and his position would be even further
from the truth under amended Section 2-207. The first four lines of
amended Section 2-207 are comprehensive; they apply to all Article 2
contracts:
Subject to Section 2-202, if (i) conduct by both parties
recognizes the existence of a contract although their records do
not otherwise establish a contract, (ii) a contract is formed by
an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract formed in any
manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms additional
to or different from those in the contract being confirmed, the
terms of the contract are .

...

9

The difficulty is that the parties think that they are making a
binding deal at the time of the first, and often the only, conversation.
They are not like industrial buyers and sellers who anticipate
negotiations and, perhaps, multiple exchanges of documents. So it

96.
97.

Id. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
Id. § 2-207.
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seems to me that the seller must either incorporate the terms in the box
into the telephone or e-mail contract or somehow make his term in the
box into a modification.
Consider Hill under amended Section 2-207. Since the arbitration
clause appears only in Gateway's record,9" it does not become part of
the contract under subsection a.99 If there is only one record, then the
clause does not meet subsection a for the want of a second record. If
there are two records, then the clause fails because it will not appear in
the buyer's record.
The arbitration clause would make it into the contract under
subsection b if the parties agree. Comment three invites a court's
consideration of the parties' verbal and nonverbal behavior: "There is a
variety of verbal and nonverbal behavior that may suggest agreement to
another's record. This Section leaves the interpretation of that behavior
to the discretion of the courts."

100

What behavior might do? If Gateway's agent got the buyer to
agree to the terms in the box as a part of the parties' telephone or e-mail
exchange at the time of contracting, then that might suffice to form a
If the buyer agreed that the contract would not be binding
contract.'
until after the delivery-keeping the contracting process open-then that
might work also.
An e-mail agreement after the initial contract discussion, but before
delivery, might work if the seller conditioned its delivery on the buyer's
e-mail agreement to the terms.'0 2 Of course, technically, that e-mail
might be a breach of the existing contract, but if the buyer accedes, the
resulting e-mail would be an effective modification even if one party
thought a deal had already been struck. E-mail satisfies the amended
Because consideration is not needed for
statute of frauds.10 3
modifications under Section 2-209'0° and because the seller's good faith
would arise from its legitimate need for the terms, e-mail would work.
The seller is farther out on a limb if it must rely on a click-through
agreement or a sign on the box. For the reasons stated above, the seller
should not be permitted to make an act that no rational buyer would

See 105 F.3d at 1148.
98.
See U.C.C. § 2-207(a).
99.
100. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 3.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. By substituting "record" for writing, the amendments recognize e-mail as
See id. § 2-202 (Proposed
sufficient for fulfilling Section 2-201 requirements.
Amendment 2002). Even without the amended language, the e-mails work under the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. See U.E.T.A. § 2(13); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 7006(4), (9).

104.

U.C.C. § 2-209 (2003).
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regard as an acceptance into one sufficient form-for example, a clause
on the box stating "opening this means you agree to Gateway's terms".
The buyer will have a different objection to the click-through
agreement. The buyer will understand that his click on the "I agree"
clause is a proper acceptance of the seller's terms, but now the seller's
offer is coercive. The buyer has received and spent all evening setting
up his computer, and he is sitting in his study in International Falls,
Minnesota, in his underwear with a beer when he has to decide whether
to agree to the new terms or go out in the negative-thirty-degree
temperature and return the computer. This offer is more objectionable
than a predelivery e-mail because it is coercive.
What about the second purchase? If the buyer buys twice from the
same seller, does his acknowledgement of the terms from the first sale
bind him as to the second transaction? I am not sure whether the buyer
is bound. Knowing that other party's form insists on something
occurring is normally not enough to bind me if his behavior does not
back up his form. Remember the industrial seller whose form always
demands arbitration but who always performs in the face of the buyer's
silence? There, we require the seller to come forward and insist on an
express agreement
to his arbitration term if we are to find an
"agreement.", 05 But maybe this is different. Unlike the industrial
buyer, who will express himself with his own form and thus implicitly
reject the seller's terms that are not included on his form, our Gateway
buyer makes no explicit or implicit expression of discontent with the
seller's terms." 6
What about ProCD? Amended Article 2 might treat ProCD
differently than it treats Hill. First, it is probable that amended Article 2
does not apply to ProCD.o7 Even if the data are delivered on a disk that
is a good, the contract is for the data and the disk is merely the
temporary carrier because the disk can be discarded once the data are on
the buyer's hard drive. The medium that holds data is less important
than a book where the medium is the permanent residence of the data.

105. Compare Sethness-Greenleaf, Inc. v. Green River Corp., 65 F.3d 64, 67
(7th Cir. 1995) (enforcing payment terms that appeared in over 200 invoices from seller
but not in buyer's forms in an Easterbrook opinion), with Avedon Engineering, Inc. v.
Seatex, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1091, 1095-96 (D. Colo. 2000) (holding that a
unilaterally inserted arbitration clause did not materially alter the agreement and so
became part of the contract where the terms were clear and legible, the form with the
clause was routinely used in parties' course of dealing, the buyer had at least three
chances to read the clause, and the custom in the textile industry was to include
arbitration terms in all contracts).
106. Compare ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-54, with ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 64455.
107. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (Proposed Final Draft 2003).
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Amended Section 2-103 and its attending comment support that view. 8
If Article 2 does not reach ProCD, then Easterbrook can play all he
wants with the common law without doing any harm to Article 2.109
Even if one applies amended Section 2-207 to ProCD, the result
might be different than the Hill result. Under amended Section 2-207 a
court could conclude that the purchase of a box with a warning on the
outside about terms on the inside is an agreement to those terms under
Section 2-207(b)."' Unlike Hill, this buyer is holding the terms in his
hand when he makes the contract to buy. So here, the seller avoids the
doctrinal conundrum from Hill; namely, that normal rules of contracting
would find that a contract existed long before the seller's terms show up
at his home. Particularly if the box in the buyer's hand warns of the
terms inside, then one might conclude here that the buyer's payment
shows his agreement to those terms.
I am still uncertain. Elsewhere, I have wondered whether the
outcome in Hill and ProCD is not the best one even if it disregards
conventional contract doctrine."' My colleague Professor Omri BenShahar also argues that the cost of conventional contract rituals are too
108. Amended Section 2-103(1)(k) reads:
"Goods" means all things that are movable at the time of identification to a
contract for sale. The term includes future goods, specially manufactured
goods, the unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other identified
things attached to realty as described in Section 2-107. The term does not
include information, the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities under Article 8, the subject matter of foreign exchange
transactions, or choses in action.
Id. § 2-103(1)(k). The relevant comment further states:
The definition of "goods" in this article has been amended to exclude
information not associated with goods. Thus, this article does not directly
apply to an electronic transfer of information, such as the transaction
involved in Specht v. Netscape, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
However, transactions often include both goods and information: some are
transactions in goods as that term is used in Section 2-102, and some are not.
For example, the sale of "smart goods" such as an automobile is a
transaction in goods fully within this article even though the automobile
contains many computer programs. On the other hand, an architect's
provision of architectural plans on a computer disk would not be a
transaction in goods. When a transaction includes both the sale of goods and
the transfer of rights in information, it is up to the courts to determine
whether the transaction is entirely within or outside of this article, or
whether or to what extent this article should be applied to a portion of the
transaction.
While this article may apply to a transaction including
information, nothing in this article alters, creates, or diminishes intellectual
property rights.
id. § 2-103 cmt.
109. One might even apply UCITA by analogy.
110. See Id. § 2-207(b).
111. See James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1693, 1706
n.21, 1721 (2000).
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high in these cases where almost all buyers expect and would freely
agree to the terms later found in the box. Ben-Shahar would say that my
insistence on a scripted warning in the telephone contract or on an email with the terms is excessive fealty to anachronistic contract
practices. Ben-Shahar would force the buyer to seek out the terms on
the Internet and make him bear the cost of not doing so. In cases like
Hill-where far more than ninety percent of the buyers are indifferent to
the terms and will gladly rely on the market to provide reasonably fair
terms-the ProCD outcome and Ben Shahar's argument are appealing.
So why not adopt that position?
I see several reasons for not adopting this approach. First, we still
cling to the fiction that printed forms become contracts upon the parties'
agreement. Even though few buyers are willing to read these forms, we
treat the buyers as contractually bound to the form's terms; we have not
yet converted this obligation to tort or identified it as a form of statutory
liability that is not based on an agreement. Our hesitance to convert
printed-form liability to something other than contract makes me uneasy
about completely abandoning the contract rituals. Before we make such
a conversion, we should think about the practical and theoretical
problems and about the appropriate scope of such a conversion.
Second, there are eccentrics who read forms"' and who might
refuse to agree. We should make a place in the system for them. We
might send them to a website to read the terms, but not every seller has
a website and not every telephone buyer has a computer with Internet
access. We might let them return the product, but for reasons
considered above that too has faults.
Third, sometimes the boilerplate language includes terms that
would be objectionable to a substantial number of buyers. For example,
the arbitration term in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc." 3 was held
unconscionable because of its expense. " 4 Given the proper hesitance of
courts to find terms unconscionable, we dare not rely on courts' use of
the doctrine of unconscionability to police these contracts. The careful
buyer should get the opportunity to turn down the offered contract upon
the appearance of those terms.
Finally, as I have suggested elsewhere,"'5 it is hard to swallow that
the Ford Motor Company gets the help of Section 2-207 in escaping the
grasp of a seller's form, but that the consumer buyer gets no such help.
I am certain that a large majority of industrial parties read the
112. At the Freedom From Contract Symposium, I asked the members of the
audience, numbering about seventy-five, whether any of them ever read their rental car
agreements. One hand went up-Zeidenberg's.
113. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998).
114. Id.at571.
115. See White, supra note 111, at 1721.
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boilerplate language of the other party's form only after a dispute has
arisen, yet Section 2-207, both new and old, often saves them from the
unwanted terms on another's form.
The day may come when the forms with certain goods are so
routine and so widely expected that a buyer should be bound whether he
has been warned or not, but I do not think that that day is now.
IV. CONCLUSION
If amended Section 2-207 is adopted, law professors will have the
pleasure of twenty years of debate. Judges will have fresh intellectual
victuals and even contract students will have something new to chew on.
I am certain that the new Section will cure many of ills of the old, but I
am also sure that new and unforeseen issues await it. I have hope for
the new Section for two reasons. First, this Section explicitly invites the
courts to find agreements in the verbal rubble that the parties leave
behind. Second, it makes clear the purpose of this tool-to interpret a
contract that has been made, not to see if a contract has been made. I
hope that all of you6join me in anticipating new Section 2-207's collision
with contract life. "

116. Of course, humor that must be explained is not humorous, but let me
explain the monkey joke (the humor was buried so deeply that at least three of my bright
professor colleagues needed elaborate explanation-even though they feigned laughter at
the time to avoid embarrassment). You see the monkey draws the wrong inference from
his painful experience with the cue ball. He infers that all food at this particular bar is
suspect and may be difficult to pass. A smarter and more civilized monkey would have
concluded that refraining from swallowing cue balls would sufficiently protect him from
a recurrence.
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